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Abstract 
This paper has taken into account the legal practice generated by the two texts excerpted 
from Law no. 554/2004, respectively articles 14 and 15. The need of such an endeavour is justified 
by a heterogeneous practice, which has created confusion amongst justiciable people. The 
suspension of administrative acts represents an institution in itself, and in this situation, we deal 
with the cancellations ruled by the courts when certain cumulative conditions are not complied 
with. This is precisely why we need both a theoretical and a practical analysis of the institution of 
administrative suspension by an administrative court, in the context of the two texts of the law 
mentioned above. 
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Introduction 
At present, one observes an increasing interest of European countries in consolidating and 
developing procedural warranties for protection against damages or hurting that might occur by the 
execution of the administrative act, even in the stages that are preliminary to the legal 
administrative procedure. Thus, legal regimes can have stricter or broader regulations pertaining to 
the reasons that entitle the judge to rule the measure of suspension. 
This study is trying to present the institution of suspension by the law courts of the effects of 
administrative acts, as a measure that is meant to defend the interests of the people who had their 
rights harmed and who, at the same time, apply for the cancellation of the act that is considered to 
be legal. 
This scientific endeavour reviews the European systems that give the judge the possibility to 
temporarily interrupt the effects of an administrative act. Also, the paper provides a thorough 
presentation of the texts excerpted from Law no. 554/2004, respectively articles 14 and 15, which 
entitle administrative court judges to suspend such an act, whenever they consider this measure 
necessary. 
The paper also presents certain cases when legal courts have ruled the suspension of such 
documents, by making reference both to the legal provisions and to the actual case submitted to 
judgement.  
We consider that this paper is useful both for theoreticians and practitioners in the field of 
law, and especially for those who work in the field of administrative courts, as the paper targets to 
clarify certain aspects pertaining to the suspension of administrative acts within administrative-
related actions. 
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The suspension of administrative acts in European legal systems  
In the category of legal systems that make it possible to rule the measure of suspension 
under stricter conditions, we mention the system existing in France, where article L 521-1 of the 
Code on administrative justice
1 stipulates that, when an administrative decision (even one ruling a 
rejection) makes the object of an application for annulment or for reformation, after having been 
informed by means of a notification in this respect, the judge of the “referés” (recourses, 
applications for annulment that are being judged by the administrative court) may rule the 
suspension of the execution of such decision or of some of its effects, provided that this be 
justified by emergency and there is a means that might generate, during the course of trial, “serious 
doubt” as far as the lawfulness of the decision is concerned. The above-mentioned law also 
stipulates that, when the suspension is ruled, the application for annulment or reformation of the 
decision is regulated as soon as possible, and the suspension ends at the latest when a decision is 
ruled pertaining to the application for annulment or reformation of the decision.  
The French system is dominated by the non-suspensive effect of the recourse stipulated in 
the article L 4 of the Administrative Code for Justice, which affects not only administrative 
recourses, but also the recourse ways before administrative justice. 
Recent administrative doctrines consider that both the derogations from the principle of the 
suspensive effect and the organisation of the judges' powers to rule upon the postponement or 
suspension of the execution fall under the incidence of the law.
2 
The Belgian legal system (the Law of October 17, 1991), the application for suspension has 
an accessory system, compared to the application for annulment, and the execution can only be 
suspended if serious reasons are invoked, reasons that might justify the cancellation of the act or 
regulation attacked, provided that the immediate execution of the act or regulation represents a risk 
for causing serious prejudice, which would be difficult to repair. 
Amongst the systems that make it possible to rule the measure of suspension under less 
strict conditions, one can mention the German system which, by means of paragraph 80-1 1 of the 
law on administrative jurisdiction grants a suspensive effect to the preliminary administrative 
complaint and to the application for annulment, without the intervention of the judge, but the 
German legislation also regulates exceptions from the principle of the suspensive effect of the 
recourse, by means of paragraph 80- ll of the above-mentioned law. The consequence of the 
suspensive effect is the fact that the legal force of the administrative document is suspended, such 
act lacks such force in the first stage and, therefore, it cannot be executed, nor can it generate 
consequences of another type. In theory, the German administrative law considers that the 
constitutional requirement of an effective protection of the rights leads to the possibility to make 
interventions in early stages, before the occurrence of an irreversible situation or of a prejudice 
that cannot be repaired. 
One of the most advanced systems for the protection of citizens before administrative 
authorities is enforced in Portugal, where the court has the power to take any temporary measures, 
to make any type of pressure that might be necessary for solving the case, without such ruling 
being conditioned by the parties' requests. 
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  We continue the discussion at European level and speak about the suspension of the 
execution of administrative acts. In this context, on September 13, 1989, the Ministers' Committee 
within the Council of Europe adopted the Recommendation R (89) 8, pertaining to the temporary 
jurisdictional protection in administrative matters, which recommends the governments of the 
member states of the Council of Europe to make use, both in theory and in practice, of the 
principles stipulated in this Recommendation. One can therefore draw the conclusion that, if an 
administrative act is challenged before a jurisdictional authority and this authority has not made a 
ruling pertaining to the lawfulness of such act, it is desirable that, as far as it is aked to rule on 
measures for temporary protection, in order to avoid any irreparable prejudice and by taking into 
account all circumstances and interests in question, the court be allowed to decide the full or 
partial suspension of the execution of the administrative act, by means of a quick procedure and 
for as long as it is considered to be necessary. 
Also, another recommendation, respectively Rec (2003) 16 on the execution of 
administrative and jurisdictional decisions in the field of administrative law, a recommendation 
that was adopted by the Ministers' Committee within the Council of Europe, suggests states to 
include in the established legal framework the possibility of private individuals to request before 
an administrative or jurisdictional authority the suspension of the challenged decision, if the law 
does not stipulate that the rightful suspension of the execution of the decision occurs at the very 
moment when the complaint is formulated. 
An interest of this type can also be found at Community level, such as it results from the 
case law of the Court of Justice of European Communities (CJEC), which decided that, if recourse 
is filed for the interpretation of a community rule, in order to appreciate the compatibility of the 
national norm with a community rule submitted to interpretation, while waiting for the 
interpretative decision and with the purpose of ensure full effectiveness of community law, the 
judge who is to settle the recourse may postpone the execution of the national norm whose 
lawfulness is questioned; also, the judge will have the obligation to remove any national norms 
that might prevent them from taking temporary measures. An additional argument presented is the 
system established by article 177 TCE, whose useful effect would be reduced if the national court 
postponing the ruling of a decision until the Court responds the preliminary question failed to 
order the taking of temporary measures before such moment. 
 
Suspension of administrative acts – theoretical aspects 
From a theoretical point of view, the suspension is the operation of temporary interruption 
of the effects of administrative acts. The suspension of administrative acts is a warranty for 
lawfulness, but this a warranty that only occurs in exceptional cases, in special situations. It 
supposes the temporary interruption of the production of legal effects, as well as the temporary 
postponement of the production of legal effects. Moreover, it is considered that the term 
"suspension" must also include the situations when an administrative act becomes effective 
subsequently to the moment when it was issued. This is also the case of administrative acts that 
become effective later than they were published. The fact that an administrative act becomes 
effective after its publication means the suspension of the execution obligation. This happens as, in 
keeping with the common law principles, this obligation must occur the moment when the act is 
created.  
 
The following are reasons for suspension: 
a) Challenging of lawfulness; 
b)Change of actual conditions after the issue and, implicitly, the change of the aspects 
pertaining to opportunities; 216  Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series
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c) The need to have compliance of the administrative act with the acts that are subsequently 
issued by superior bodies;  
d)The enforcement of a sanction on a natural person who has perpetrated an administrative 
deviation; 
e) Clarification of a doubt formulated by the issuing body on the lawfulness of the 
document. 
 
However, these reasons cannot transform the suspension in a rule of the legal status of 
administrative acts, just like it happens in the case of cancellation. 
Suspension is different from cancellation, with the difference been made by several aspects: 
a) Cancellation appears as a rule, while suspension is an exceptional operation; 
b)Cancellation is ruled when there are certainties that the act is illegal, including as far as its 
opportunity is concerned, while suspension is ruled when there are doubts concerning the 
lawfulness, including as far as opportunity is concerned; 
c) Any cancellation generates the final cessation of the effect of the administrative act (from 
this point of view, it is a type of nullity), while any suspension generates the temporary 
cessation of such effects (it is a singular aspect within the status of administrative acts). 
 
As far as the forms of suspension are concerned, if we take into account the legislation in 
effect, we can appreciate that the suspension of administrative acts may occur:  
 
a) rightfully (on the grounds of an express provision of the law); 
b)on the grounds of an order issued by the superior body; 
c) on the grounds of the decision of temporary withdrawal ruled by the issuing body; 
d)on the grounds of a court order or of an ordinance of the Public Ministry. 
 
In conclusion, suspension can be ordered by a legal act, but it can also be produced by the 
lawmaker. 
The most important situation for suspension in keeping with the law is stipulated in article 
123, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. According to this piece of legislation, the presentation of the 
prefect’s action before an administrative court against an act of the county or local council or of 
the Mayor will withdraw the rightful suspension of the act, if the prefect considers that the act in 
question is illegal. Another example of suspension in keeping with the law is given by the 
Government’s Ordinance no. 2/2001 on the legal status of contraventions. The provisions of 
article 32 of this law stipulate that any complaint filed by the contravener against the report drawn 
up for the contravention will withdraw the suspension of the execution of the act of sanction.  
Also, the provisions of Law no. 554/2004 on administrative courts stipulate a situation of 
suspension by means of a legal act: Upon request, the court has the right to take the measure of 
suspending the administrative act making the object of a litigation submitted to judgement “in 
better justified cases and in order to prevent the occurrence of imminent damages, the application 
for suspension will be immediately settled by the court, even without the parties attending, and the 
order ruled will be rightfully enforceable". 
 
Suspension of administrative acts by the courts 
At present, following the suggestions made in the administrative doctrine and taking into 
account the solutions ruled by administrative courts, the provisions of Law no. 554/2004 were 
reconsidered, as far as the suspension of the execution of administrative acts is concerned, due to Marta-Claudia Cliza 217
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the changes and additions made by Law no. 262/2007. The current regulations stipulate, as a 
general rule, the legal suspension, upon request, of the execution of administrative acts, 
simultaneously to the filing of the administrative recourse or of the application for the annulment 
of the administrative act before an administrative court, the grounds of the matter being the 
provisions of articles 14 and 15 of the law. Also, it is stipulated that the attacked document be 
rightfully suspended if the court is informed by the prefect or by the National Agency of Public 
Officers. 
The Romanian law recognizes the principle of the automatic execution of administrative 
acts, and therefore Law no. 554/2004, by means of the provisions pertaining to the suspension of 
the execution of administrative documents creates an exception to this principle and correlates 
European requirements with national ones. The suspension of the execution of administrative acts 
is a warranty for lawfulness, which only occurs in exceptional cases and in special situations. 
Suspension involves either the temporary interruption of the production of legal effects, or the 
temporary postponement of the legal effects. 
Article 14 of Law no. 554/2004, with subsequent changes and additions, regulates the 
procedure for suspension of the execution of administrative acts by legal means, as suspension is 
optional and only admissible following the filing of the preliminary administrative recourse, in 
keeping with the provisions of article 7, as the well-grounded case and any imminent damage that 
should be prevented must be proved.  
Recent administrative doctrines claim that, in the case of suspensions that are based on the 
exercise of an administrative recourse, administrative courts play a decisive role, in the sense that 
they must appreciate the apparent illegality of the administrative act and then carefully decide the 
suspension of the act, only when this is obviously necessary. However, legal practise has proven 
that there are cases when the suspension of the execution of an administrative act must verify if all 
legal conditions are complied with, by analysing the evidence existing in the file and the 
statements made by the parties; the legal arguments of the persons involved in the litigation must 
also be verified. 
As for the conditions pertaining to the actual justification of the suspension, if we are to 
analyse the provisions of article 14, paragraph (1) of the law, we can see that the suspension of the 
execution of an administrative act can only be ruled if the following conditions are jointly 
complied with: the existence of a well-grounded case and the need to prevent imminent damage. 
The provisions of article 14, paragraph (3) regulates the situation when a major public interest is 
involved, an interest that might seriously affect the functioning of an administrative public service 
and which would justify the measure of suspension. A third condition is added, a procedural one 
this time: the plaintiff must prove the initiation of the preliminary administrative procedure. This is 
conditions is decisive for the admissibility of the application for suspension of the execution of an 
administrative act, in keeping with the provisions of article 14 and the compliance with this 
condition is proven by the previous notification of the issuing body. If no such proof is presented, 
the correct solution of the court is to reject such application as not admissible.  
a) Existence of a well-grounded case. At present, the provisions of article 2, paragraph (1) 
and letter T of Law no. 554/2004 define the phrase “well-grounded case” as a legal actual 
and lawful circumstance that might generate serious doubt as far as the lawfulness of the 
administrative act is concerned.  
The fact that previously there was no definition for well-grounded cases led to numerous 
interpretations in the legal practise, as far as the content of this notion was concerned. Numerous 
examples were given and, with the purpose of limiting the range of this notion, the administrative 
doctrine gave examples of circumstances that might prove that there is a “well-grounded case” (for 
example, those connected to the actual and lawful situation, including aspects that emphasize the 218  Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series
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illegal nature of the act and the abuse of authority, the efforts made, the attitude of the authority, 
the method of summoning the interested body and the casting of votes). 
Legal practise has constantly mentioned the fact that the existence of a well-grounded case 
may be withheld if the case showed powerful and obvious doubt as far as the lawfulness 
presumption was concerned, as this presumption represents one of the basic elements of the 
enforceable nature of administrative acts. Other criteria that can be taken into account when 
proving a well-grounded case are: the actual nature of the measure enforced by the public 
authority, the subsequent conduct of the addressee of the act and the effects such act might have on 
certain associated legal relations. 
Well-grounded cases cannot be justified by invoking certain aspects that pertain to the 
lawfulness of the administrative act, as such aspects concern the basis of the act, which is only 
analysed by the action for annulment.  
The court only has the possibility to perform a limited research on the appearance of 
common law, as the grounds of the litigation cannot be harmed during the procedure stipulated by 
law.  
The provisions of article 2, paragraph (1), letter s) define the term “imminent damage” as 
any future and predictable material prejudice or, as the case may be, the serious predictable 
damaging of the functioning of a public authority or of a public service. 
Following an analysis of the notion of “prejudice”, one might say, just as in the case of 
offensive civil responsibility, any violation of a right has a patrimonial value. Future prejudice is 
the prejudice that has not yet occurred, but is certain to occur, even if one cannot estimate how 
long such prejudice will last. Therefore, both current and future prejudices are certain and can be 
evaluated. If the lawmaker has included the idea of future prejudice in the notion of “imminent 
damage”, it is obvious that, even if the prejudice is under development and has partially occurred, 
one can speak about imminent damage, as even in this situation there are reasons justifying the 
suspension, if we are to take into account the fact that an administrative act which has produced 
the entire prejudice it was susceptible to generate cannot be suspended. 
Future prejudice must also be predictable, that is certain – as it is mentioned in the 
terminology used for civil responsibility matters –, even if one cannot estimate how long such 
prejudice will last. Any prejudice that is not certain to occur does not allow the urgent measure of 
the suspension of the administrative act that was attacked. 
As for the form any prejudice may take, this can be material, actual and trial-related. This 
means any prejudice that is capable of putting the plaintiff in a disadvantageous situation, such as 
creating a new legal situation by the execution of the administrative act, by the future generation of 
certain rights that did not exist when the preliminary complaint was filed, a situation that might 
persuade the plaintiff to adopt a trial-related position that might also involve any third party who 
might benefit from the act that was attacked. In order to admit the suspension of execution, any 
prejudice must basically be unlikely to be repaired by a subsequent indemnity. 
As far as imminent damage was concerned, the practise of some courts has also shown that 
this notion is construed in the sense of the civil law, that there must be a material, real and actual 
prejudice which must be proved. The definition of the term “imminent damage” leads to the 
conclusion that the serious and predictable disturbance of the functioning of a public authority or 
service, as stipulated in the 2
nd part of article 2, letter s) of the law can be mentioned as the 
grounds for an application for suspension. However, it is necessary that the disturbance begun or 
which is to begin be so serious as to threaten not only an activity of the public authority or of a 
public service, but their very functioning.
3 
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As the suspension of the execution can only be ruled under express and limited conditions 
stipulated by the law, as this represents an exception from the rule of automatic execution of 
administrative acts, it results that the delegated judge has the responsibility to actually evaluate, 
with no discrimination or bias and by comparing the situation to each case, the compliance with 
the conditions pertaining to the admissibility of the application for suspension, in keeping with the 
provisions of article 14 of the law, but without a restrictive interpretation of the actual grounds 
justifying the suspension, as otherwise the purpose of the suspension cannot be reached. 
4 
The measure for suspension of the execution of an administrative document ruled in keeping 
with the provisions of article 14 only lasts until the ruling of the main issue. The measure of 
suspension is rightfully extended until the case is finally and irrevocably settled, even if the 
plaintiff has not applied for the suspension of the execution of the administrative act on the 
grounds of paragraph (1) of article 15 of the law, as regulated in article 15, paragraph (4). Thus, 
the lawmaker has given an even greater efficiency to the institution of suspension of the execution 
of the administrative act, as the lawfulness appearance was rejected by the fact that the main issue 
was admitted. 
The term for the recourse was established within 5 days from the date when the ruling is 
communicated, and it was made clear that the recourse does not suspend the execution. The 
express will of the lawmaker was to free this category of decisions from the possibility of ruling 
the suspension of execution by exercising any possible means of attack, as such decisions are 
special by the fact that they are rightfully enforceable.
5 
The regulation mentioned in article 15 of Law no. 554/2004, as changed by Law no. 
262/2007, refers to the application for suspension of the execution of the unilateral administrative 
act, as formulated after the initiation of the legal stage involving the lawfulness control performed 
on the administrative act. The plaintiff may file such an application either by an action addressed 
to the competent court for the total or partial cancellation of the act that was attacked, or by a 
separate action. 
After analysing the provisions of article 15, we can identify the conditions that must be 
complied with for the admissibility of such an application. These conditions are: the existence of 
an action for the total or partial cancellation of a unilateral administrative act; the existence of a 
well-grounded case; the prevention of imminent damage; the filing of an application of this type, 
until the main issue is settled.
6 
Another aspect taken from legal practice was the idea of reiterating the application for 
suspension. This idea is grounded on the provisions of article 15; therefore this happens at the 
same time with the action for annulment or until the settling of the main issue pertaining to the 
action for annulment, after courts had previously rejected such an application. 
In such situations, some trial courts appreciated that, in keeping with the provisions of 
article 14, paragraph 6 of Law no. 554/2004, there would be a matter to be judged and therefore 
admitted this exception, which was invoked either automatically by the court, or by the other party 
involved in the litigation. 
Having this solution at hand, the following defences were reiterated during the recourse. 
Thus, the decision of the trial court to reject the application for suspension on the grounds of 

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5 Gabriela – Victora Birsan, Bogdan Georgescu, Legea contenciosului administrativ nr. 554/2004 adnotata 
(Translation: Comments on the text of Law no. 554/2004 on administrative courts), Hamangiu Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2007, p. 87 and the following 
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article 166 of the Code for Civil Procedure (the exception of the matter to be judged) is illegal 
from two points of view. 
From a first point of view, the court's arguments based upon the provisions of article 14, 
paragraph 6 of Law no. 554/2204 cannot be maintained for the following reasons: 
It is true that the provisions of article 14, paragraph 6, target to avoid the abusive exercise of 
trial-related rights, by filing successive applications for suspension for the same reasons, also 
ignoring the fact that the application for suspension was rejected by the court. However, by 
introducing this interdiction in the text of articles 14 and 15, the lawmaker obviously took into 
account the enforcement of the interdiction distinctly, in each and every mentioned situation. 
In the case of the application for suspension based upon the provisions of article 14, we 
speak about a distinct procedural stage – the suspension of the execution of the administrative act 
during the preliminary procedure and until a ruling is made for the main issue; in the case of the 
same application, but based upon the provisions of article 15, another procedural stage is stipulated 
– the suspension of the execution of the administrative act following the filing of the action for the 
cancellation of the act, either at the same time or by a separate action, until a ruling is made for the 
main issue. 
Therefore, in the case submitted to judgement, the application for suspension has other legal 
grounds, as it was formulated during a different procedural stage. Thus, one cannot state that there 
is a successive application for suspension, even if the reasons are in fact the same. 
In the presented case, as long as it can be proven that the right stipulated in article 15 was 
used in good will, on the grounds of new rightful reasons for applying for suspension, the court 
should analyze such application. 
The legal provisions pertaining to “successive applications for suspension for the same 
reasons” mandatorily stipulate that these applications must include the main actual and rightful 
reasons, as stated in the provisions of article 112, paragraph 1 and point 4 of the Code for Civil 
Procedure. Therefore, the filing of an application for suspension with other legal grounds cannot 
be included in the interdiction imposed by the lawmaker. 
From the second point of view, one cannot say that the case involves the authority of solved 
matter, as there is no case identity. This conclusion becomes even more necessary as one may say 
that the provisions of the above-mentioned article 14, paragraph 6 and article 15, paragraph 2 grant 
efficiency to the principle of the authority of solved matter, as regulated by the provisions of 
article 1201 of the Civil Code. This principle supposes a triple identity: parties’ identity, object 
identity and case identity. However, if the new case is based by other legal grounds than the first 
one, like the case submitted to judgement, there is no judged matter. (in this sense, see T.S., dec. 
no. 568/1955 and dec. 816/1955, C. D 1955, volume 2, page 219, respectively page 220). 
Therefore, the reasons presented by the trial court in the sense of admitting the authority of 
judged matter for the subsequent application for suspension and which are based upon the 
provisions of article 15 of Law no. 554/2004 infringe the principle of the fundamental right of free 
access to justice, a right that is guaranteed by article 21, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the reasons presented render these provisions unenforceable. 
Furthermore, interpreting these provisions contrary to those that were mentioned previously 
would mean infringing the provisions of article 6, paragraph 1 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights regulating the equity of the procedure, as the plaintiff’s application, if based upon 
the provisions of article 15 could not be "heard" – it could not be legally examined by the notified 
court. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has constantly stipulated that the 
convention guarantees actual and effective rights, not theoretical and illusory ones. Moreover, 
according to the Court, the fact that trial courts fail to explicitly rule on an express application, but 
they prefer to implicitly reject the case, making this dependant on the settlement of another Marta-Claudia Cliza 221
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application is an infringement of the provisions of article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention (the 
case Gheorghe vs. Romania, Decision of March 15, 2007, application no. 19215/04). 
This is the current point of view of the supreme court, such as one may see by analysing the 
content of the Decision no. 2190/2009 of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (the decision 
was not published). 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to revise the idea of temporary interruption by the courts of 
the effects of administrative acts. In fact, the paper was intended to be a theoretical and practical 
analysis of the institution of suspension, based upon the provisions of articles 14 and 15 of Law 
no. 554/2004. 
Also, the paper presented some examples taken from legal practise, in order to facilitate the 
activity of practitioners in the field of law. 
This analysis is important as, in the case of suspension, we deal with derogation from the 
rule of the automatic execution of administrative acts and this exception is worth being minutely 
analyzed. 
Also, this paper is important due to the fact that it presents the different stands that courts 
take as far as the issue discussed is concerned.  
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